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 “Literature accommodates many kinds of knowledge. In a novel like     
 Robinson Crusoe there is a historical knowledge, a geographical, a social (colonial), a   
 technological, a botanical, an anthropological knowledge.” Roland Barthes, “Inaugural   
 Lecture, Collège de France. 
   
 “The English live with the turmoil of two incompatible passions: a strange appetite for 
 adventure and a strange appetite for legality.” Jorge Luis Borges, “The Labyrinths of the 




ROBINSON Crusoe is taken a captive at sea before his shipwreck makes him one on land 
and the difference between how he characterizes and resists his two antagonists, the 
“Moor” and the “Savage,” respectively, says much about how Defoe links adversity to 
place in Europe’s uneven imperial land and maritime spaces, even as he uses the enemy 
to shape Crusoe’s contentious subjectivity, tying interiority and the external world. The 
ostensibly empty American island has a counterpart, a crowded Old World, and properly 
understanding Crusoe as the island’s engineer requires understanding Defoe as the 
architect of a totality, a fictional universe in which an account of an Englishman’s life 
becomes in Rousseau’s words “a whole library.”1 Disregarding his father’s warnings 
against leaving “my Father’s House and my Native Country” and seeking to rise above 
the “middle Station of Life,” the young Crusoe follows his inclination to go to sea, 
despite the ill-omened storms he encounters on his first trip.2 After he first profitably sails 
to the “Coast of Guinea” in Africa with the “honest” captain, his ship is captured by “a 
Turkish Rover” and taken to the Moroccan port of Sallee, where he is “kept by the 
Captain of the Rover as his proper Prize, and made his Slave” (17, 18, 19). For two years 
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in Sallee, Crusoe suffers “the common drudgery of Slaves about his [Master’s] house,” 
until a fishing trip ordered by his master gives him the opportunity to break free—in the 
company of a “Maresco” young man, Xury, who swears allegiance to Crusoe by 
“Mahomet and his Father’s beard” (18, 23). 
 As Christopher Hill has underscored in a notable essay, most people only think 
they know Robinson Crusoe, a novel largely read in abridgements that open with the 
shipwreck and the island.3 This sells short the novel’s formal spatial design, which 
contrasts its hero’s early mobility with his subsequent settlement(s), while concurrently 
encoding ideas about law, enmity, and sovereignty into geographic constructions. 
Although it may appear that geography is distinguished by an objective, neutral subject, a 
genealogy of geographical knowledge reveals that early modern European polemics over 
the demarcations and legal representations of space were imbued with polemos itself, war 
and conflict. Space articulates the theory and practice of empire; as Lauren Benton 
argues, “because conflicts were spatially distributed and because legal stories possessed a 
spatial dimension, associations formed with surprising ease between patterns of law and 
landscape.”4 In this article, I highlight the polemical nature of Robinson Crusoe’s spatial 
experience, maritime and insular. As I shall argue, Defoe’s representations of his hero’s 
achievements—both Crusoe’s astute seafaring and his later claims to sovereignty and 
possession of “his” island—build on extraliterary systems of knowledge in which war 
offers blueprints for grasping colonial encounters and global space.  
 Undergirding Robinson Crusoe in general and its hero’s escape from his Barbary 
captivity in particular is a remarkable geographical imaginary, internalized though only 
partly understood by Crusoe. After he slips away in the fishing boat he has 
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commandeered, Crusoe astutely considers that his Moorish master would surely believe 
he is heading north towards “the Straits-mouth, (as indeed any one that had been in their 
Wits must ha’ been supposed to do)” (23). Instead, Crusoe sails south, down the African 
coast well “beyond the Emperor of Morocco’s Dominions, or indeed of any other King 
thereabouts” (24). His is a clever tactic, but Crusoe can only undertake it because the 
world has been constituted for him, so to speak. Although he cannot properly navigate 
because he “had no Instruments to take an Observation to know what Latitude we were 
in,” Crusoe knows that the “Island of the Canaries and the Cape de Verd Islands,” which 
lie close to the African coast and well south of Sallee, are European possessions (26). He 
also knows that European ships ply these waters regularly to engage in Europe’s goods 
and slave trade, and that all he has to do is to hug the coast and avoid the hinterland. It is 
worth noting here that Crusoe explains to “his” reader that he had steered south because 
“who would ha’ suppos’d we were saild on to the southward to the truly Barbarian 
Coast, where whole Nations of Negroes were sure to surround us with their Canoes and 
destroy us” (23). Still, the novel itself shows that this menace is much exaggerated and 
that what really saves Crusoe is his knowledge of lived geography and the extent of 
Europe’s reach.5  
Travelling as far south as “the River Gambia or Sennegall,” Crusoe seeks to get as 
close to the Cape de Verde, for “I knew that all the ships from Europe, which sail’d either 
to the Coast of Guiney, or to Brasil, or to the East-Indies, made this Cape or those 
Islands” (29). In other words, sailing south will get you North, as, sooner or later, he 
knows, a European ship would sail by. Crusoe’s maritime know-how and shrewd 
decision to escape by heading south appear to be instances of what the French Classicists 
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Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant have called mêtis, a “coherent body of mental 
attitudes and intellectual behavior” which “combine various skills and experience 
acquired over the years,” a kind of learning that they contrast with episteme, the 
systematic knowledge of the philosophers and mathematicians.6 Yet, as we shall see, both 
Crusoe’s intuitive and studied reactions to danger and hostility underscore that a great 
number of knowledges, systematic and experiential, that Defoe himself had—that Europe 
gained and constructed by 1719—of navigating and sailing the world’s oceans and seas, 
not to mention of settling and possessing the world, were impressed by war. Crusoe’s 
crafty escape from North Africa as well the novel’s merging of spatiality, psychology, 
sociability, and war in its representation of his response to the “Savages”— witness the 
militarized punishments he metes out to them—show Crusoe to be not only a memoirist 
and a maker of things, but also a strategist, a user and interpreter of space and the 
knowledges of space. 
 Defoe’s spatialization of Crusoe’s experience not only builds on but also lays bare 
the kinds of political and colonial learning that render Defoe’s novel “the essential 
parable of how geography and conquest go together,” in Edward Said’s powerful words.7 
This article is part of a longer study that makes the case that the eighteenth-century novel 
is best understood not as narrating the pacific experience of a self-interested middle class, 
but rather as the genre that specializes in thick representations and anatomies of human 
subjectivity, vulnerability, and association in hostile imaginary worlds.8 I situate my 
analysis here at the intersection of two forms of imperial knowledge, cartography and 
political theory, within which spatiality and war are mutually producing in addition to 
together constituting a global order of nature. Indeed, Robinson Crusoe stages two 
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distinct modes of belligerent spatial practice, foot-loose adventurism, on the one hand, 
and colonial-settler autochthonism, on the other hand, as Defoe exploits two related 
imperial geographical discourses, natural law (and its derivative the Law of Nations, 
forerunner of today’s International Law and Law of War) and cartography, drawing on 
them for both verisimilar and fantastical representations. Avowedly objective, rational 
expressions of nature, both maps and the discourse of natural law actually “materialize a 
view of the mind more than of external reality, project[ing] an order of reason onto the 
world,” as they work to naturalize hierarchical apprehensions of the Earth.9  
 The “history of ideas,” insist Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, demands not only 
a genealogy in time, but also “a geography and geology of ideas.”10 Rather than a mere 
background and container of historical and temporal events, space “is at once a 
precondition and a result of social superstructures,” argued Henri Lefebvre, perhaps 
spatiality’s central theorist.11 Spatiality underlies human experience, culture, and 
stories.12 Still, as Kristen Ross points out, in her remarkable book on the Paris Commune, 
the spatial critic encounters “the difficulty … of vocabulary, for while words like 
‘historical’ and ‘political’ convey a dynamic of intentionality, vitality, and human 
motivation, ‘spatial,’ on the other hand, connotes stasis, neutrality, and passivity.”13 Yet 
as Lefebvre strikingly notes, “all productive activity is defined by the incessant to-and-fro 
between temporality (succession, concatenation) and spatiality (simultaneity, 
synchronicity).”14 Lefebvre’s critique of “everyday life” has demonstrated that to analyze 
“social space” is to pose it as “the terrain of strategic thought [and] political practice,” 
constituted through “an encounter with history.”15 Necessarily relational, spatial analysis 
discloses social and political relations. If history smoothly rhymes with individual 
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memory and consciousness, “endeavoring to decipher discourse through the use of 
spatial, strategic metaphors, enables one to grasp precisely the points at which discourses 
are transformed in, through, and on the basis of relations of power,” as Michel Foucault 
observed.16  
 A heightened attention to space and place has marked a number of recent readings 
of Robinson Crusoe, influenced as this article is by the “spatial turn” in the humanities 
and the social sciences outlined above, as well as by postcolonial theory, itself invested in 
the “distinctively political essence of geography.”17 These studies have begun to remedy 
older scholarship’s neglect of space in favor of the poetics of character and 
consciousness.18 If Robinson Crusoe is “a magnificent instance of fearful 
contemporaneity,” as Suvir Kaul wonderfully writes, it is because the “specifics of the 
new in eighteenth-century English culture” that set the novel apart as a genre, including 
“individualism and subjectivity,” often depend on “the exotic and the faraway … the new 
worlds of mercantile exploration and colonization.”19 Although I agree with Kaul, I want 
to stress that the novel’s novelty and commerce with the world are mediated by given 
cultural discourses; that “realism” is often not achieved by imitating reality but rather by 
imitating extraliterary discourses that have “already ‘mirrored’ reality.”20 Drawing on the 
rhetoric of maps and international law, Defoe ties subjectivity and global spatiality. 
 I shall return to cartography and Defoe’s mapping of Crusoe’s escape a bit later, 
but I want first to outline how I aim to link space and the political discourse of natural 
law on the Island of Despair, on which Defoe stitches together heightened representations 
of everyday life and of bellicose colonial reason. Crusoe’s is a space-inflected 
subjectivity: Defoe’s depictions of his hero’s psychology, his sense of who he is and his 
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passions—his present-oriented fear and future-oriented dread, despair, faith, anger, his 
“secret Kind of Pleasure” in “Possession” (100)—entangles Crusoe’s inner life with the 
novel’s central setting, a desert island, itself both a “physical” place and a “mental” space 
produced by a theoretical abstraction.21 The “state of nature” underpins European 
domestic political narratives, even as it also subtends imperial theory. Literary and 
cultural scholars tend to think of the state of nature as a conceptual device political 
philosophers used to theorize the rise and development of pacific civic politics and rights 
from discussions of natural rights. We are used to the narrative that sees John Locke and 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau opposing an essentially peaceable natural man to Hobbes’s 
bellicose one. But the state of nature—and here Hobbes and Locke are not far apart—can 
only be fully understood if we take stock of the fact that natural law was used to theorize 
the rights of war and peace domestically, within the European state system, and globally 
in the European colonial context. Indeed, as the political theorists Richard Tuck and 
James Tully have shown, anatomies of the state of nature in the seventeenth century were 
often intertwined with novel arguments for rights of war, possession, and punishment.22 
Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) invoked the basic rights of men in the state of nature (as 
Hobbes later dubbed it) to claim the private right to make war, thus justifying the Dutch 
East India Company’s (VOC) involvement in the seizure of an enormously valuable 
Portuguese ship, the Santa Caterina. He imagined equilibrium of violence in his version 
of the state of nature. Danger in that condition not only gave the individual the right to 
defend himself; this right was, according to Grotius and even Locke, the very basis of the 
state’s own right to punish its own enemies. 
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The island is, then, both a “realist” space and a discursive space of origin. The 
walls which define Crusoe’s captivity are not only natural ones, the island’s shores, but 
also those that early modern European political discourse erected between savagery and 
civilization, nature and culture. In theorizing the transition from a presumed past simple 
existence to the conditions of current European civil life, seventeenth-century political 
thinkers produced imaginary genealogies that began with the putative past experience of 
“the individual placed in the apolitical or prepolitical condition of the state of nature,” 
rooting their new science in “the terrible vulnerability of the individual reduced to his or 
her own forces.”23 By imbuing the original political scene—as well as “autonomy”—with 
war and its affect, Grotius and his descendants Hobbes and Locke gave birth to political 
narratives of association that also reflected and justified the existential reality of the 
European state at war in the seventeenth century. Solitude, which shapes Crusoe’s 
psychology on the island, structures how the novel intermeshes his subjectivity and his 
worldly apprehensions, a word that neatly bundles senses of understanding, fear, and 
possession, thus epitomizing the very work of Defoe’s novel. That to which Robinson 
Crusoe condemns its hero is what Enlightenment thinkers agreed was the beginning of 
knowledge.24 Yet not only have hypothetical scenes of solitude shaped modern 
epistemology, they have also molded modern political thought, underpinning “state of 
nature” and natural law arguments that, as I shall argue later, structure Crusoe’s stance 
towards his “barbarian” enemies.  
 The natural law tradition was widespread in the seventeenth century and, as Max 
Novak explains, “as a child of his age, Defoe formulated his own scheme of natural law, 
and by borrowing, combining, and emphasizing various concepts in the writings of 
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Grotius, Hobbes, Locke, and many other philosophers, he was able to achieve a certain 
eclectic originality.”25 I want to stress two points here in regards to natural law, which 
will occupy us later. First, war and judicial thought intertwine in this discourse. War was 
central because modern natural law and law of nations theory developed in the context of 
ambitious modernizing European nation states eager both to legitimize their own 
sovereignty while bracketing religious challenges (Hobbes and Grotius are exemplary in 
this regard), and to bolster their legal claims in aggressive international competitions over 
land and resources. Second, fictional mimesis transforms learned discourses. Robinson 
Crusoe does not propound natural law, but rather embodies and deforms it in its fictional 
world. Defoe’s conceptions of natural law “do not float free: they are tied to the speakers 
by whom they are enounced, and generated from the matrix of individual interests out of 
which their speakers act in the world.”26 Natural law, as we shall see, allows Defoe to 
present his hero as both naked and king. Whether Crusoe meditates on his vulnerability 
or on his right of punishment against the savages, whether he sees himself as a lonely 
shipwreck or as a sovereign, Defoe brings into play a discursive tradition that helped to 
smooth out such contradictions, and whose beneficiaries included explorers, profiteers, 
and monarchs. Analyzed by Puritans and Catholics alike, furthermore, this body of law, 
with its original fable, allowed Defoe to construct a dialectic between original sin 
explaining the Cannibals’ depravity in the “state of nature” and the modern day savagery 
of European colonial exploitation, exemplified by the Spanish “whose Cruelties in 
America,” Friday gives Crusoe to understand, are “remembered by all the Nations from 
Father to Son” (215).   
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Mapping the Escape 
If modern natural (and international) law was largely a theoretical discourse developed by 
academic jurists beginning in the sixteenth century to justify and regulate colonial 
competitive violence, modern maps drew on “centuries of geographical representations 
and the experiences of thousands of people.”27 Geography, according to Defoe’s 
biographer James Sutherland, was “one of his most passionate interests.”28 If a “map may 
constitute itself in words,” then Robinson Crusoe vividly maps the physical world 
verbally, the seas and African Atlantic littoral of Crusoe’s travels, as well as the spaces 
and places of his American island later.29 Where Crusoe adventures, Defoe maps: the 
novel frequently presents Crusoe’s motion and even ocular surveys as hypotyposes (a 
rhetorical figure by which something that is not present is brought, “as it were, before the 
eyes of the hearer or reader”) of different kinds of maps, including navigational charts 
and topographical maps.30 Crusoe’s escape route from his captivity in Sallee to his 
eventual rescue by the Portuguese ship doubles as both a desperate traveler’s itinerary 
(Crusoe’s) and an arm-chair imperial explorer’s world map (reader’s). This in fact may 
help to explain its Janus-like nature. For, on the one hand, Crusoe’s voyage is wildly 
implausible: it goes without saying that Crusoe’s escape from his Muslim captors, in a 
small fishing boat that he himself—an inexperienced young mariner who has not sailed 
for two years—navigates for almost 1600 miles (from Sallee—current-day Salé, a port of 
Rabat in today’s Morocco—to anywhere near the Capo de Verde islands) is an almost 
impossible feat. The “map” Defoe verbally portrays does not adhere to “the universal 
science of measurement and order” that underpinned maps from the sixteenth century 
on.31 Yet, on the other hand, Defoe’s mapping impulse accurately renders the collective 
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adventure of imperial Europe and its “dream of universality.”32 Maps were central, as 
Matthew Edney writes, “to a variety of geographical, historical, and political discourses” 
in eighteenth-century Europe, as they functioned to manage a growing imbalance in scale 
between European individuals’ experience and the extent of their empires. Ignoring “the 
realities of geographical space,” maps made available “huge expanses of space” for 
imagination and exploitation “as territory, regardless of the practicalities of actual control 
or exploitation.”33 As Harley points out, although maps are “never the reality,” they help 
“to create a different reality.”34 
The distortions and lacunae of Defoe’s verbal map, then, mark “different levels of 
representation,” superimposing a fantastical itinerary “map” and a fantasized “bird’s eye 
view” one.35 Less the probable journey of one fictional individual than the motion of 
Defoe’s finger on a map as reflected in the funny mirror of fiction, limning the colonial 
adventures of White Europe, Crusoe’s maritime travels entail as well an authorial act of 
“spatial denial.”36 Verisimilitude here, as it is in respect to some subsequent undertakings 
by the protagonist that we shall examine later, is perhaps beside the point. For Defoe is 
perhaps a “realist of a larger reality,” in Ursula Le Guin’s arresting words.37 Crusoe’s 
route and subsequent trip to Brazil allow Defoe, as Peter Hulme has insightfully pointed 
out, to “recapitulate the European ‘history of discovery’: the first tentative voyages down 
the West African Coast, the entanglement with Islam, the crossing of the Atlantic, even 
the movement of Brazilian expertise to the Caribbean.”38 Hulme’s influential 
reassessment of Defoe’s novel as a “Caribbean book” interrogates Ian Watt’s seminal 
enthroning of Robinson Crusoe as the paradigmatic formal realist novel by insisting on 
its spatially-marked quality as a “colonial romance”(208). He makes the important point 
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that Defoe has his protagonist follow in the footsteps of Francis Drake and Walter Ralegh 
who “held in heroic suspension the twin meanings of adventure, as they risked “their 
capital and their bodies” (183). Still, adventure and its correlate language “depends on 
where it happens,” as Franco Moretti writes, emphasizing “the place-bound nature of 
literary forms.”39 On the Island of Despair, as I argue below, Crusoe’s romance-like 
heroism (one would almost say superheroism) rests upon a Eurocentric juridical 
discourse—not tales of famous English buccaneers—which reconciles Crusoe’s 
vulnerability and his overwhelming military victory. 
 Geography, which straddles the given and the made, is a shaping force. In 
Robinson Crusoe, there are English towns and cities from and to which the young Crusoe 
runs away and occasionally returns (York, Hull, London); sea lanes on which he sails, is 
captured, escapes, is rescued, sails again and almost drowns; Atlantic islands (the 
Canaries); African landfalls; the Brazil plantation, and famously, the “uninhabited” 
Caribbean island on which he survives and which he claims. (There are also the 
homelands of the Cannibals, especially Friday’s, to which Friday’s father and the rescued 
Spaniard sail in order to fetch the rest of the Europeans rescued by Friday’s people, an 
abortive narrative capsule in the novel.)40 Defoe maps Crusoe’s ventures on seas and 
oceans before he takes up his main subject, Crusoe’s marooning on the American Island 
of Despair (as well as, briefly, his stay in Brazil, where he becomes a planter). Although 
Crusoe’s maritime adventures are not Defoe’s main concern, it pays to juxtapose the two 
spaces of Crusoe’s vulnerability, as I have been arguing. Crusoe’s early imprisonment in 
Barbary prefigures his later Caribbean island captivity, complete with a Xury who 
anticipates Friday and an attempt to escape in a “little Vessel,” successful in Sallee but 
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twice a failure later on the Island of Despair (127,141).41 But the contrast between the 
“Moor’s domain” and America is fundamental to Defoe’s representation of Crusoe’s self-
construction. And what sets the two captivities apart is the difference in the kind of 
enemy Crusoe faces. Or, rather, to underscore my argument, the difference in the kind of 
enemy Defoe makes of the enemy. That Crusoe is now, as he says, “out of the ordinary 
Course of the Trade of Mankind,” sets the desert island and its so-called Savages apart 
from their North African hostile counterparts (62). To parse the spaces he traverses in the 
Mediterranean-Atlantic world and their representations is to bring “to light the internal 
logic” of Defoe’s novel.42 
“As much as guns and warships, maps have been the weapons of imperialism,” 
writes the pioneering critical geographer J. B. Harley.43 Reflecting on Crusoe’s escape 
route, however, helps to expose the ebb and flow of power and the gaps in imperial 
sovereignty that attended Europe’s encounter with its others—which cartographic 
practices normally blot out. It might seem tempting to conceive of “the narrative of 
European empire as generating a slow but steady rationalization of space,” but, as Benton 
emphasizes, “empires did not cover space evenly but composed a fabric that was full of 
holes.”44 Robinson Crusoe knows that the relevant geography of the Western 
Mediterranean and the Atlantic—the gateway to Europe’s game changing American 
colonies—is not that of uniform space; that it is instead differentiated by an interplay of 
amicability and animosity. The hostile “Moor’s domain,” it turns out, is bordered to the 
south by two overlapping friendly realms, Europe’s and “my friendly Negroes,” as 
Crusoe after all characterizes the black Africans, who supply him and Xury with 
provisions. Soon, a European ship, a Portuguese, which carries him to the Brasil, rescues 
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the escaped English slave. Defoe subordinates European conflict (for now) to the one 
obtaining between Crusoe and the Moors. His treatment on board the ship as well as in 
Brazil itself is a model of fantasized European ecumenical humanitarianism and 
commercial harmony, colored by Defoe’s characteristic overlaying of sentiment onto 
capital. (As in Roxana, “friend” is a relation with which Defoe reconciles wallet and 
heart.) As Charles Gildon, Defoe’s enviously opprobrious contemporary, mocks, Defoe 
made his hero “a Protestant in London and a Papist in Brasil.”45 Crusoe will, after a few 
years in the Portuguese colony, complete the third leg of the Atlantic slave trade triangle, 
sailing as an advisor and partner on an extralegal private slaving ship —but intending, it 
seems, on returning to his slave-operated sugar plantation in Bahia. But shipwrecked in 
the course of a great storm, “which took us quite out of our Knowledge,” he is driven 
ashore by raging waves, the only survivor. Thus begins Crusoe’s second captivity in the 
novel, on the Island of Despair, where he becomes “a prisoner locked up with the eternal 
bars and bolts of the Ocean” (113). 
Amity is one key to the novel and enmity is another. Nonetheless, as the classical 
philologist Emile Benveniste has shown, “hospitality” and “hostility” are historically 
related. (Hostis, a Latin word, denotes an enemy, and seems to follow from the term 
signifying a familiar stranger. Benveniste emphasizes that originally “hospitality” did not 
mean any kind of “sentimental friendship,” but rather a sort of “contract in as much as it 
relied on an exchange.”)46 I am less interested here in Robinson Crusoe as an emblem of 
the global nature of capitalism encoded in friendship at sea, or the novel’s relation to 
Defoe’s projecting semi-fictional writings (such as The Voyage Round the World 
(1724)).47 Crusoe’s struggle with the sea, “furious as an Enemy,” and terror at his naked 
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condition set the tone for his relation to his world: he is no indomitable traveler or 
conquistador taking possession in the name of his monarch. Fear and hostility, which 
frequently discompose Crusoe’s self, structure the novel in general in my view and 
perhaps even unify it in lieu of a plot. They are the wages of Crusoe’s hazardous 
undertakings. (If realist experience underlies Robinson Crusoe, it is the kind of 
experience that reminds us of the common root “experience” shares with “peril.”)48 
Ostensibly the story of a “private man,” as the novel’s “Editor” apologizes in the novel’s 
Preface, Robinson Crusoe has raised an imperial-colonial myth like no other. Yet, if 
Martin Green is surely right that although Crusoe eventually erects a colony on the island 
“fit to belong to the British empire,” his story is on the surface an “anti-imperialist story,” 
then Defoe has already begun to shape his reluctant imperialist in Sallee and at sea, 
threading together vulnerability and self-reliance.49 Defoe represents a fictional person, 
even as he encodes a war-inflected set of relations between Europe and its others. In a 
world populated not only with people but also with the manifestations of power, Defoe 
knowingly ties place, enmity, and selfhood. Captivity and vulnerability, as Linda Colley 
has persuasively shown, were inherent to empire, especially when it came to Britain, 
whose relatively small size and population resulted in notable “imperial overstretch.” 50 
We have now largely forgotten, she reminds us, that “between 1600 and the early 1640s, 
corsairs operating from North African territories seized more than 800 English, Scottish, 
Welsh, and Irish trading vessels in the Mediterranean and Atlantic . . . Some 12,000 
English subjects may have been captured over these decades and in most cases 
subsequently enslaved for life in North Africa and elsewhere in the Ottoman empire” (43-
4). The larger context of Defoe’s representation of Crusoe’s first imprisonment is the 
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Ottoman empire’s long standing conflict with Europe, one that started at roughly the 
same time that England’s main European antagonists—and Defoe’s national bugbears—
France and Spain, began their hegemonic expansions in Europe by invading Italy.51 
What sort of adversaries are the Moor and the Turk in Robinson Crusoe, then? 
What sort of relations obtains between the Barbary Coast attackers and Crusoe? Crusoe 
refers to his captors as “rovers,” but this term, a near synonym of “pirates,” obscures the 
nature of  “the long and complex span of skirmishes between the sailors of Europe and 
North Africa,” Peter Earle highlights.52 The conflict between European and Barbary 
Coast sailors was an “eternal war,” with “no beginning or end.” Granted “a license by 
[their] sovereign to fit out a ship to attack [their] sovereign’s enemies,” these combatants 
should be “more properly styled corsairs or privateers,” Earle insists (23). Many 
European jurists, including Christian Wolff and Grotius, reasoned that North African 
corsairs should not be considered piratical, for “one must determine the character of the 
antagonists with reference to the nature of association to which they belong.”53 Another 
Dutch scholar agreed with his compatriot: “The peoples of Algiers, Tripoli, Tunis and 
Salee [sic] are not pirates,” he wrote, “but rather organized states, which have a fixed 
territory in which there is an established government, and with which, as with other 
nations, we are now at peace, now at war.”54 Colley, for her part, makes the point that the 
misnomer hides a more visceral British national anxiety: “Barbary appalled because its 
corsairs converted the sea from an emblem of commerce, freedom, power, and proud 
British identity, into a source of menace and potential slavery.”55 
Crusoe is “perfectly overwhelmed” by “this Change of my Circumstances from a 
Merchant to a miserable Slave”; later, as circumstances change, astutely prepares his 
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escape, in the “Shoulder of Mutton” sailboat, a clear instance of mêtis (19). Still, although 
Defoe gives voice to Crusoe’s experience as a captive, he does not complicate his 
character’s personal submission. Interested as he may have been in the Ottoman threat, 
Defoe neither pursues the political nature of an Englishman’s entanglement with the 
Ottoman Empire in this novel, nor does he theorize the relation between politics and 
enmity in the Mediterranean.56 Rather, as we saw, Crusoe’s escape maps the maritime 
spatial variations and gaps within European imperial sovereignty. Defoe—and Swift—as 
Colley writes, recognized that “captivity was an integral part of Britain’s overseas 
experience.”57 Although Colley is right to link Crusoe’s captivity in Morocco to his 
captivity later on his desert island and to see both as complicating the standard view of 
Crusoe as “the archetypal conqueror and coloniser,” her shorthand reading of Defoe’s 
novel does not do justice the full implications of his differential representations of 
Crusoe’s two captivities (1). 
  “Every new age and every new epoch in the coexistence of peoples, empires, and 
countries,” argues Carl Schmitt, is founded on a new nomos, an order of the earth.58 The 
“Age of Discovery” ushered in “a balance of land and sea—in the opposition of two 
orders that determined the nomos of the earth precisely in their mutual tension” (173). 
The sea was henceforth free (the mare liberum of Grotius), not subject to possession, in 
contradistinction to land. Interestingly, Schmitt opens his book by deconstructing the 
freedom of the sea as a universal norm: “before the birth of the great sea powers, the 
axiom of the “freedom of the sea” meant something very simple, that the sea was a free 
zone for booty” (43). Yet, and this is important for our purposes, Islam, Europe’s old foe, 
did not figure in Europe’s transition to maritime empires. It matters, therefore, that Defoe 
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chooses the American Carib and not the Muslim Moor as the “structuring” enemy of his 
novel.59 Defoe’s novel participates in a “polemic of possession,” in Rolena Adorno’s 
felicitous phrase.60 Enemies are not given but made; they are chosen and conceptualized 
in reference to systems of thought that in justifying or banning war, clothe war with 
particular meanings. Crusoe’s Guinea coast bound trading English ship meets its 
equivalent, if not its equal, in the Moroccan rover on the Mediterranean. No such 
correspondence can obtain later in the Caribbean between Crusoe and the subaltern 
Friday or the “Cannibals.” Whereas Xury knows guns well, proposing to give any 
dangerous men “the Shoot gun,” Friday is shocked by the “wonderful Fund of Death and 
Destruction” in Crusoe’s gun. Muskets and gunpowder, themselves tools of reason, 
“serve as a figure for the violence and warfare that lurk at the foundational moment of 
sovereignty,” as Christopher Loar insightfully highlights.61 If, for England and Europe, 
the “Barbary wars” were proximate geographically as well as being practices waged by 
and against the commensurate Islamic states of North Africa, Crusoe’s hostile 
engagements on the Island of Despair, as we shall see, encoded a different kind of war, 
peripheral, asymmetrical, and yet, essential to philosophically- and theologically-
conceived rights of possession and dominion. These rights were justified by the self-
serving universalist premises of the discourse of natural rights and “the Law of Nations” 
(ius gentium), which “emerged first [within Roman Law] in the context of what was in 
practice an aggressive and expansionist power, deeply bound by a highly sophisticated 
legal culture.”62  
For it is in ostensibly empty America that Defoe will equip his hero with 
discourses predicated on “the state of nature,” where political questions of sovereignty 
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and possession can be represented in the form of adventures.63 Here, we might pause to 
observe that the dual individual-collective nature of Defoe’s maritime cartographic 
representation discussed above resembles the dual nature of Defoe’s island adventures, 
where Crusoe advances from potential victim to indisputable victor (“victim, as a matter 
of fact, descends from the Latin victima, a “creature killed in a religious sacrifice”).64 
That the Amerindian “lacked the positive characteristic of equality,” allowed war to be 
veiled, hidden by a discourse of colonial settlement for which, as Carl Schmitt asserts, the 
“emerging new world did not appear as a new enemy, but as free space, as an area open 
to European occupation and expansion.”65 For Schmitt, political thought and activity, the 
political, cannot exist without the figure of the enemy.66 Appearing as “free space” is, of 
course, of the essence in Robinson Crusoe, which disavows the original presence of the 
indigenous population within the self-serving story of a desert island near the mouth of 
the Amazon.67 Yet Defoe does represent Crusoe drawing on natural law and the law of 
nations (without marking his thoughts as such) to debate with himself his proper political 
and military role in the Amerindians’ wars already in progress. “Adventure” and 
“legality,” it turns out then, are not as distinct as Jorge Luis Borges takes them to be.68 
For the vulnerability of outnumbered European colonial adventurers—whose own 
interests overlapped only slantwise with their powerful states’—often made European 
law a refuge and a central element in their own stories. Vulnerable subjects, whose 
relation to law was influenced by both geography and topography, they also became 
carriers of law, which itself took form in the colony in relation to their individual 
situations.69 Crusoe is himself such a carrier of law, as we shall see.  
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When Crusoe became Europe’s paradigm of the isolated natural man, Defoe’s 
novel in effect replaced many earlier narrative avatars of such a story. As Novak writes, 
“in 1708, the year that Alexander Selkirk was rescued from the island of Juan Fernandez, 
Ibn al-Tufail’s [sic] The Improvement of Reason, a fictional narrative about such a 
solitaire, was translated into English.”70 Defoe knew both island narratives, but he wrote 
a “version” of the natural man story that superseded them. Though benefiting from the 
twelfth-century Islamic-Iberian philosophical narrative, Defoe’s novel turned the natural 
man story into a cultural myth of the new European nomos, as it resituated its hero from 
the Mediterranean (of Ibn Tufayl) and the Pacific (of Alexander Selkirk) to America. Just 
as Robinson Crusoe features an Old World sidekick, Xury, only to abandon him in favor 
of Friday and the fuller development of his interaction with Crusoe, it turns from Ibn 
Tufayl’s own crowded Iberia to Locke’s and Hobbes’s “empty” America. That, as Locke 
proclaims, in the “beginning the whole world was America” was a European intellectual 
and imperial fantasy and thought experiment, not the historical reality, to be sure. But 
America’s discovery nevertheless provided “a free space, apparently one with neither a 
history nor any political forms at all.”71 America in Robinson Crusoe follows that first 
chronological encounter of Europe and its Muslim Other, who, Moor or Turk, never 
figures in Defoe’s America, a symptom, fortuitous or not, of the inexorable decline of 
Europe’s old enemy, the world of Islam.72  
 
The Footprint, Fear, and the Rights of War 
How Crusoe sets out to appropriate the island’s land and recast it in his own culture’s 
image has been well studied by critics—and rewritten in a few of Robinson Crusoe’s 
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most ingenious adaptations.73 Yet, as Said insists, “neither imperialism nor colonialism is 
a simple act of accumulation and acquisition. Both are supported by ideological 
formations a well as forms of knowledge affiliated with domination.”74  As I began to 
argue above, possession and sovereignty are predicated on spatial legal fictions that aim 
to define the enemy and authorize his punishment. The stance of a solitary man on a 
desert island ties Robinson Crusoe to the fiction of the state of nature in the natural law 
tradition, intertwining the settler’s subjectivity with the problem of the enemy’s 
unsettling presence. To be sure, Robinson Crusoe is no more a mere fictional illustration 
of a politico-juridical doctrine than it is a mere fictional depiction of the real life story of 
the marooning of Alexander Selkirk. The threat solitary individuals (read Europeans) feel 
in hostile worlds and their reasoned right to punish enemies are, however, basic 
structuring principles of both natural law narratives and Robinson Crusoe, which alike 
grant European arrivals in the Americas the language and associated tacit power to 
legitimate their supposed rights of possession and of punishment.  
 Seemingly secure in person and property, with “two Plantations,” and a “Country 
Seat,” which he has enlarged and walled, Crusoe has, from a hunter-gatherer, made 
himself into a settled landlord and sovereign king. Then, his existence is upended, for 
 
It happen’d one Day about Noon going towards my Boat, I was exceedingly 
surpriz’d with the Print of a Man’s naked Foot on the Shore, which was very plain 
to be seen in the Sand. (153) 
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The footprint Crusoe perceives not only shatters his settled life, but also makes the war 
theme more explicit in two ways. First, Defoe militarizes Crusoe’s actions and language. 
Crusoe takes to calling his home “my Castle” and considers demolishing his animal 
enclosures so “the Enemy might not find them” (159). He then fortifies his residence, 
surrounding his cave with a second wall, “thickened with Pieces of Timber . . . having in 
it seven little Holes . . . [through which] I contrived to plant the Musquets . . .  [which] I 
planted like a Cannon, and fitted them into Frames that held them like a Carriage, that so 
I could fire all the seven Guns in two Minutes Time” (161). The island becomes a truly 
hostile place: Crusoe lives in dread, under “Pressure of Mind, surrounded with Danger, 
and in Expectation every Night of being murther’d and devour’d before Morning.” This 
“constant Snare of the Fear of Man” not only upends his domestic comfort, but also mars 
his prayers (163). For the first time, as well, he abandons a project (to make beer), after 
he comes upon “the Shore spread with Skulls, Hands, Feet, and other Bones of Humane 
Bodies” (165). His “Invention now [running] quite another Way,” he “could think of 
nothing but how I might destroy some of these Monsters” (168). Crusoe fantasizes about 
blowing up the “wretches” with “five or six Pound of Gun-Powder” which he will hide 
“under the Place where they made their Fire,” or about laying himself in “Ambush with 
my three Guns, all double-loaded; and in the middle of their bloody Ceremony, let[ting] 
fly at them . . . and then falling in upon them with my three Pistols, and my Sword” 
(169). A year and a half later, Crusoe finally comes upon “no less than nine naked 
Savages, sitting around a small Fire, they had made . . . to dress some of their Barbarous 
diet.” Crusoe execrates their “Marks of Horror . . . the Blood, Bones, and part of the 
Flesh of Humane Bodies”; he puts himself “in a Posture of Defence,” load[s] “all my 
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Cannon”; and begins “to be mighty impatient for Intelligence abroad, for I had no Spies 
to send out” (182). 
 This second “Cannibal feast” and, ultimately, Crusoe’s discovery that a large 
group of them were about to kill and eat “one of the bearded men,” “a white Man,” “an 
European,” enrages Crusoe, who attacks the Amerindians and, with the help of Friday 
and the freed “Spaniard,” kills 17 out of the 21 Savages. Crusoe ends his account of this 
battle with a remarkable tabular tally of the battle casualties, verifying his earlier 
judgment that they “had no more Power to attempt their own Escape than their Flesh had 
to resist our Shot” (237, 235). 
 Crusoe’s tactics and war knowledge and language—fortifications, gunnery, the 
horrors of mutilated bodies, reconnaissance—as well as this final battle with the savages 
and easy victory, ought not, however, to obscure Robinson Crusoe’s second—and more 
fundamental—thinking about and with war. Before finally fighting an all-out battle with 
the savages a number of years after he sees the footprint, Crusoe arraigns them in his 
mind for their crimes. Crusoe, the novel emphasizes, does not act immediately. Though 
abhorring the cannibals’ “hellish Brutality,” he soon puts their threat in perspective and 
realizes that they pose no danger to him. He has not yet reflected—he realizes after 
planning his revenge—that he has been designing the “killing twenty or thirty naked 
Savages” for “an Offence” that he had not yet “entered into a Discussion of in my 
Thoughts.” Later, possessed of “cooler and calmer Thoughts,” he questions his own 
authority “to pretend to be Judge and Executioner upon these Men as Criminals,” whom 
Providence had “suffered in his wise Disposition of the World, to have no other Guide 
than that of their own abominable and vitiated passions” (170). Crusoe goes on to 
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emphasize that he has no lawful authority to punish the cannibals. He thanks God on his 
knees that he had delivered him from the “Bloodguiltiness” of the “Destruction of 
innocent Creatures” and sensibly decides that “neither in Principle or in Policy, I ought 
one way or the other to concern my self in this affair” (172). In representing Crusoe’s 
war, Defoe seems to echo Locke: though he at first hankers for a “passionate and hasty” 
revenge, he later pursues “a sedate settled design upon” the cannibals, which, according 
to John Locke, “puts him in a state of war” with them.75 Locke himself is a recipient of an 
old tradition, of course.  
Yet Crusoe’s thoughtful hesitation, even psychomachia, conceals the manner in 
which Defoe expresses Crusoe’s fear, loathing, and moral dilemma with an external 
language, situating his hero’s interior conflict within a Eurocentric politico-legal 
discursive frame that limits and sanctions violence. Crusoe reasons from a number of 
points. First, he has no authority to counter God’s will and plan for the savages. Second, 
the savages are not mere “Murtheres”: in killing “Captive[s] taken in War,” they do no 
worse than Europeans in their wars, who “often put whole Troops of Men to the Sword, 
without giving Quarter, though they threw down their Arms and submitted.” Third, and 
most importantly, Crusoe reasons that “these People have done me no Injury,” and that to 
massacre them on account of their barbarity, idolatry, and bloody customs, would be to 
“justify the Conduct of the Spaniards in all their Barbarities practis’d in America,” whose 
“very Name” is “reckon’d to be frightful and terrible to all People of Humanity, or of 
Christian Compassion” (172). He ruminates that “as to the Crimes they were guilty of 
towards one another, I had nothing to do with them; they were National and I ought to 
leave them to the Justice of God, who is the Governour of Nations, and knows how by 
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National Punishments to make a just Retribution for National Offences” (172-3). By 
“National,” Crusoe means what today we would call “International,” precisely the 
domain of relations theorized by the law of nations to obtain among sovereigns. This also 
highlights that Crusoe regards the Amerindians as political foes. Defoe, in other words, 
does not here represent formless encounters between Crusoe and the cannibals, but rather 
he shows Crusoe (though unmarked by him) drawing on “natural law,” a long tradition of 
legal thought—believed to codify the law of reason “written in the hearts of men by 
God.” Indeed, when Crusoe execrates the example of Spain, we are reminded that Defoe 
is adapting a political discourse whose central problem was “the phenomenon of Spanish 
hegemony.”76 
 Natural law, as I argued, was essential both to the struggle over domestic political 
consent within Europe and to the formulation of the Law of Nations, whose debates 
amounted to elaborating the settlement of “empty” lands in a doubly hostile context: 
hostile because of European colonial rivalries and hostile as well in relation to the 
Amerindian native population. The confluence of these two traditions is important for our 
understanding of Robinson Crusoe, where Defoe “blurs the boundaries of genres” in 
order to endow Crusoe with a “local” form of knowledge. Law, as Clifford Geertz offers, 
is a “craft of place.”77 
 Questions regarding the state of nature allowed political philosophers and jurists 
to both to analyze domestic sovereignty and to engage in thought experiments that 
supported colonial expansion.  It presented legal justifications for “the occupation of 
vacant land” and addressed “the natural slavery of the non-Christian savage,” building 
on, and occasionally resisting, Aristotle’s position in the Politics. In an age of bloody 
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religious wars and rapacious colonial expansion, this body of legal thought, universal and 
international in character, attempted to theorize possession, the just war, and the right to 
punishment. In his seminal De Jure Belli ac Pacis (The Rights of War and Peace)—a 
treatise read by Locke, Rousseau and almost certainly Defoe—Grotius, “the Father of 
International Law,” argues against “some” who thought that war “is a Stranger to all 
Justice.”78 Grotius goes on, in his encyclopedic three volumes, to offer that war is 
legitimate precisely because it is natural to man: “for the Mother of Natural Law is 
Human Nature itself.” Grotius set out to prove that “to make war is not contrary to the 
Law of Nature” as proved by reason, historical precedent, and general agreement. War is 
not opposed to Reason because the first duty of both man and animal is to “preserve 
himself in his natural State” (180). Nature has in fact “given to every animal Strength to 
defend itself … A Calf is sensible of its Horns, even before they are grown and will push 
with his head” (183). This looks like an original narrative, an “In the beginning was war” 
kind of story. In reality, of course, this is a just-so story. Grotius knew the ending and, to 
borrow from E. L. Doctorow, he designed “his story to arrive at the ending.”79 The now 
here is the present in which European states are scrambling to claim their piece of the 
colonial pie, especially to counter Iberian hegemony: Grotius’s negative logic is crucial 
because it allows him to reconcile “reason” with an already bellicose cosmos. Grotius 
presents an encyclopedic network of evidence that proves, according to him, the 
legitimacy of war. Crucially, then, war is not illegal according to the “Law of Nations.” 
 Grotius, in fact, bases a central strand of his argument on unpacking the “right of 
punishment,” which “proceeds from the Law of Nature.” 80 “Most Men assign three just 
Causes of War,” he asserts, “Defence, the Recovery of what’s our own, and Punishment” 
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(395). War, Grotius goes on to say, is justified because of the natural right of 
“Punishment”:  
 
We make no Doubt, but War may be justly undertaken against … those who eat 
Human Flesh, . . . , and against those who practice Piracy (1022-23). 
What is at stake in Robinson Crusoe, I am arguing, is not mere conflict but reasoned war.  
Common sense would seem to dictate that wars are the affair of states, not of single 
individuals. Crusoe is engaged in war, however, because he is no mere adventurer or 
castaway fighting haphazard skirmishes or merely defending his own life, but a character 
whose negotiations of selfhood and descriptions of “experience” lean on moral and 
intellectual systems deeply influenced by war thought. For the presumed right of a 
particular kind of private person to wage war was creatively construed in the natural law 
tradition to prove the right of nations to do so, as well as “justly” to delimit these rights. 
Remarkably, European juridical thought about war and peace among states often took the 
form of thinking in terms of the rights and duties of a “stripped-down” individual agent 
whose paramount goal is self-preservation.81  
In highlighting Crusoe’s puzzlement at the right and precedent of his 
“punishment,” Defoe sets the stage for his hero’s discursive meditation on the rights of 
war and peace. Crusoe’s thoughts are informed by a long European tradition of 
exceptionalism, legalism, and conquest. Immediately after coming upon the grizzly 
remains of the savages’ feast, Crusoe gives “God thanks that he had cast my Lot in a part 
of the World, where I was distinguished from such dreadful Creatures.” For the first time, 
and henceforth, Crusoe recognizes his superior lot in life. Crusoe’s deliberations 
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gradually transform his stance and political representations in the novel from that of a 
solitaire living in a “mere state of nature” first to that of a jurist considering normative 
“rights” and the Savages’ “crimes” and then to a sovereign executing rightful 
punishment. This paradoxical doubling is the remarkable feat of Defoe’s colonial 
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